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Medicare Subrogation of Third Party Liability
Claims-An Evolving (and Elusive) Effort
INTRODUCTION

The principle of subrogation of Medicare payments from its
beneficiaries is not new, nor is it terribly complex on its face. A brief but
common fact situation can be used to illustrate the circumstances to which
this Comment attempts to speak. Betty, a sixty-seven-year-old retiree, is
driving through an intersection when a large truck runs a stop light and
collides with her vehicle. She is immediately taken to the hospital for
severe injuries. Over the course of several months, she undergoes the
litany of medical treatment that is associated with such trauma. Betty hires
an attorney to represent her injury claim against the negligent driver on a
standard contingency fee basis. The attorney proceeds to negotiate a
settlement, but the extent of Betty's injuries is not yet known, and thus the
value of her claim is yet to be determined. In the meantime, she needs
care. Because she is an eligible beneficiary, Medicare will pay for her
treatment, 2 and let us assume that she successfully recovers from the
liability3 insurance provider. This Comment will not simply highlight
Medicare's right to recover its payments when Betty recovers from the
liability carrier. Rather, it is the process of that recovery and its evolving
impact on the litigation of tortious injuries that calls for comment.

1. Throughout this Comment, the term "subrogation" will be used as a general
reference to any right of reimbursement or repayment sought by Medicare or the U.S.
Government of its conditional payments to a beneficiary of the Medicare program. The
general use of the term should not be construed as to undermine the complex and expansive
nature of issues and theory that involve both the legal and equitable principles of
subrogation. This Comment focuses narrowly on the topic of Medicare subrogation only.
For a general illustration of the theory of subrogation in various contractual relationships,
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 310 (2008).
2. We assume, for purposes of this example, no care is administered that would be
precluded from coverage pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1395y (2006).
3. This Comment uses the term "liability insurance" often to illustrate a standard
recovery source from a tortious injury in which a plaintiff recovers from the party at fault.
However, this term should not be seen as limiting Medicare's subrogation rights to only
liability insurance. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b) provides that no-fault insurance, as well as
workers' compensation plans, may be just as applicable if they provide the source of
recovery.
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What responsibilities-whether implied by virtue of representation or
by law-do plaintiffs' attorneys have when Medicare wants its money
back? What responsibilities do the liability insurance carriers have in such
situations? What about the insurance defense counsel? The plaintiff
herself? This Comment is canalized towards the steps that Medicare may
take to recover what it considers the conditional' payments of Betty's
treatment and the developing legal consequences involved in what the
author suggests is an inconsistent, if not underdeveloped, realm of law. It
will also attempt to showcase examples of subrogation techniques that take
the government's statutory authority to recover payments beyond what was
likely intended by Congress. The preceding questions and others will help
set the framework for a practical analysis of today's concept of Medicare
subrogation.
I.

THE RECOVERY PROCESS-WHO IS VULNERABLE?

Before an analysis of the subrogation process can be made, it is
important to identify the contemporary political context of this topic. Since
its inception in 1965,' Medicare has been a politically charged issue. 6 Add
to the program's history the fact that contemporary political debates
heavily involve the current amount of debt the United States carries and the
potential for default if not contained,' and you have a perfect political
storm for pinching the pennies of government. The political environment
of the day has thus put Medicare squarely in the crosshairs of spending
reductions. What once might have been described as a rather informal
recovery process might now seem like an unpredictable obstacle.
A.

What does the currentprocess look like?

The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid8 Services (CMS) and the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) have promulgated an
4. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(i), Medicare will make payments for treatment
on a conditional basis when it expects reimbursement from what the statute identifies as
"primary" plans, as discussed infra in greater detail.
5. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
6. See, e.g., THEODORE R. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE (2d ed. 2000).
7. The Debt Alarm is Heard,N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/07/15/opinion/1 5fril.html.
8. The Medicare and Medicaid programs are not entirely interchangeable; however,
they are close enough to lend to each other a similar analysis with regard to the subrogation
process. See Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. O'Hara, 604 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2010). The scope of
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enormity of administrative law under Title 42 of the Code of Federal
Regulations. 9 After sifting through the code, a plaintiffs attorney learns
how a Medicare-eligible client may dramatically change the process of the
injury claim. As soon as he has identified his client as a Medicare
beneficiary, the attorney should have alerted the Medicare Coordination of
Benefits Contractor (COBC) and the Medicare Secondary Payer Recovery
CMS is now intimately involved in the
Contractor (MSPRC).10
progression of the plaintiff s personal injury recovery, well before any form
of settlement or judgment has been reached. While the plaintiff undergoes
medical treatment and her attorney negotiates with the liability carrier, the
federal government-or, in this case, its contractor-is calculating," by
methods largely unknown,' 2 a potential subrogation lien against the
plaintiffs recovery.
On its face, this is fairly straightforward. We do not want taxpayers to
be responsible for medical bills caused by a negligent driver, nor do we
expect an injured plaintiff to receive a windfall from an unfortunate event.
However, this creates a problem for the plaintiffs attorney: How does he
manage his client's recovery and provide adequate counsel on a net
settlement or judgment amount if there is a subrogation lien by Medicare
that is floating somewhere in the periphery of the case's resolution? 3
this Comment is narrowly tailored toward the Medicare program for the sake of specificity
and brevity, but the author does include examples of Medicaid subrogation, either by case
law or statute, that are relevant to the framework of issues addressed by this Comment.
9. See 42 C.F.R. § 411.24 (2012).
10. For a flow chart provided by MSPRC portraying the standard recovery process, see
Overview of the Recovery Process, MSPRC, I (Nov. 11, 2010), http://www.msprc.info/
processes/nghp%20flowchart.pdf.
11. See 42 C.F.R. § 411.24(c).
12. 42 C.F.R. § 411.37(c) purports to codify the actual formula used by CMS to
calculate the amount of its final demand for reimbursement. This formula, however, fails to
show what conditional payments CMS takes into account when making the final
determination. See 42 C.F.R. § 411.37(c). The current regulations require the complete
disclosure of a settlement or judgment amount to CMS, along with disclosure of the attorney
fees and an itemized costs list (labeled "procurement costs"). Id. However, the beneficiary
and her attorney are never given the opportunity to review values that CMS uses to calculate
its demand, such as which conditional payments for treatment were attributed to the injury
that is covered by the "primary" policy, and which were not. This determination is crucial,
because it often speaks to the fundamental proximate cause legal argument that juries take
up in injury litigation-that is, whether the defendant's acts (i.e. negligent driving) are
attributed to the particular injury.
13. For a concise overview of governmental subrogation liens on personal injury
claims, including Medicare, see Erik V. Larson & Diana L. Panian, Successfully
DischargingMedical Liens in PersonalInjury Cases, 32 CUMB. L. REv. 349 (2002).
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Unfortunately, one answer may lie in the client hiring more attorneys.
One attorney may have to limit representation to resolving the personal
injury claim, while the client is forced to hire additional counsel 1 4 to protect
against an action by the federal government to recover any conditional
payments. One obvious reason for this may be the standard contingency
fee arrangement used in so many injury claims. The resolution of a
subrogation lien does not likely lend itself to contingency fee: it "feels"
more like an hourly billing matter because the final outcome of the case is
not the source of payment for the attorney. A firm that operates
exclusively on contingency arrangements would thus be forced to burden
the client with hiring additional counsel for the lien resolution.
B.

Not Just the Plaintif'sProblem

Examples and circumstances described thus far have largely spoken to
problems encountered by the plaintiff or her attorney in dealing with
Medicare subrogation claims. However, a close reading of the applicable
regulations reveals that CMS may opt to recover its conditional payment
not from the beneficiary or his attorney at all." 42 C.F.R. § 411.24(i)
provides in part as follows:
(i) Special rules.
(1) In the case of liability insurance settlements and disputed claims
under employer group health plans, workers' compensation insurance
or plan, and no-fault insurance, the following rule applies: If Medicare
is not reimbursed as required by paragraph (h) of this section, the
primary payer must reimburse Medicare even though it has already
reimbursedthe beneficiary or other party.
(2) The provisions of paragraph (i)(1) of this section also apply if a

primary payer makes its payment to an entity other than Medicare when
it is, or should be, aware that Medicare has made a conditional primary
payment.16

14. Law firms have been representing the insurance industry's subrogation efforts under
various legal avenues for some time. See ERISA laws discussed infra. However, it may
come as a surprise to some plaintiffs attorneys that a trending practice has become
subrogation representation on behalf of the injured plaintif For an example of one such
firm that touts its particular approach to such legal representation, see Healthcare Lien
Resolution, GARRETSON RESOLUTION GRP., http://www.garretsongroup.com/services/Pages/
Healthcare-Lien-Resolution.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 2012) ("Attorneys' need for a trusted
healthcare lien resolution service partner is more apparent now than ever before.").
15. See 42 C.F.R. § 411.24(i).
16. 42 C.F.R. § 411.24(i)(l)-(2) (emphasis added).
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Consider what the above regulation provides under our opening
example. If Betty recovers the policy limits of the liability plan that
insured the defendant in her claim, and fails to reimburse Medicare for her
treatment as provided by regulation, Medicare may recover its conditional
payments from the insurance company that has already paid out on its
claim. The potential for the liability carrier to sustain this type of "double
loss" may trigger unwelcome defensive posturing by insurance companies
when processing settlements. Consider an example: defense counsel mails
the settlement proceeds to plaintiffs attorney, but the check is made out to
the plaintiff, the plaintiffs attorney, and Medicare. By doing this, defense
counsel is probably preventing Medicare from returning in the future to
claim their right of reimbursement because defense counsel can now point
to the fact that his payment included Medicare on the check. The insurance
company is, understandably, seeking to create a safety net. However, this
type of defensive posturing is disproportionally detrimental to the injured
claimant and her attorney. Practically speaking, where does one find
someone within the Medicare machine to endorse the check so that
proceeds may be disbursed? Does accepting such a check mean that the
plaintiff has assured any future subrogation efforts will be directed at her?
Such a defensive method of settling claims would likely have the effect of
shifting the risk of future subrogation action to the plaintiffs attorney,
rendering 42 C.F.R. § 411.24(i) ineffective as a governmental enforcement
tool. Further, as one author suggests,' 7 it may even have the effect of
plaintiffs' attorneys declining to represent injured Medicare beneficiaries
because of that risk.
Additionally, the plaintiffs attorney is not the only party to this
process with an interest in her client's Medicare eligibility from the
beginning. The failure of the "primary" plan-the defendant's liability
insurance carrier in our example-from reporting and disclosing certain
mandatory information as required by statute18 will carry with it a
substantial penalty.19 At a glance, it would seem as if the statute were

17. Rick Swedloff, Can't Settle, Can't Sue: How Congress Stole Tort Remedies From
Medicare Beneficiaries, 41 AKRON L. REv. 557, 599 (2008).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(8) (2006).
19. See Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Extension Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-173, §
111, 121 Stat. 2492 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(8)(B) (2006)) (requiring
disclosure of "the identity of the claimant for which the determination under subparagraph
(A) was made; and . .. such other information as the Secretary shall specify in order to
enable the Secretary to make an appropriate determination concerning coordination of
benefits, including any applicable recovery claim"). Failure to comply with this reporting
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written to balance the consequences of non-disclosure between the injured
beneficiary and the primary policyholder. Further review, however, shows
that this balancing attempt actually shifts the greatest weight to the back of
the plaintiff in the form of an inability to settle her claim with the liability
20
carrier.
II. ACTIONS FOR SUBROGATION-A REVIEW OF MODERN CASE LAW
A. ERISA Subrogation Distinguished
Attorneys practicing in personal injury and similar tort litigation will
likely state with confidence their understanding of the concept of the
subrogation of liability proceeds by non-governmental, secondary
insurance policies, due to the decades of litigation surrounding rights first
codified under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of
1974.21 Dual-wielding the swords of the federal taxing power 2 2 and the
Commerce Clause,23 Congress enacted sweeping reforms and regulation to
employee benefits plans. Among the relevant reforms was a right of
enforcement vested in, among other entities, a plan fiduciary to bring an
action for subrogation to enforce the plan's right to recoup payments if a
beneficiary recovers the cost of her medical bills from a third party. 24 For
an easy example, let us make a few modifications to our original plaintiff.
Suppose we change her age to thirty-five and use the same facts
surrounding her injury, but instead of Medicare providing interim coverage
until she recovers, a private health insurer provides coverage. If the private
health insurer is considered a plan governed by ERISA, they will have, as a
fiduciary to the.plan, a right to recover their payments when the plaintiff
recovers from the liability carrier.25
requirement imposes a $1,000 per day fine on the insurance carrier. 42 U.S.C. §
1395y(b)(8)(E).
20. Swedloff, supra note 17, at 588-92 (discussing with detailed formulae the
economic incentives for settlement on either side of the adversarial system when a Medicare
lien is asserted).
21. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006)).
22. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
23. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2006); see also Martin H. Drake, Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v.
O'Hara:Application of the FederalCommon Law "Make- Whole Doctrine" to Preclude the
Effect of Reimbursement and Subrogation Provisions in Health Benefit Plans, 34 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 227, 227 (2010).

25. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
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As the American Journal of Trial Advocacy notes in a recent article,2 6
the leading case upholding such an action to subrogate on behalf of a plan
fiduciary is Zurich American Insurance Company v. O'Hara.27 In Zurich, a
catastrophically injured plaintiff (O'Hara) recovered a substantial monetary
amount from a defendant driver's liability insurance carrier. 28 Following
the recovery, the plaintiffs ERISA-governed group health plan brought an
action to recover its payments for its beneficiary's medical care. 29
Although the case turns largely on an application of the "make-whole"
doctrine to an ERISA-governed plan's right to subrogate,30 the holding
brings into focus a distinction between ERISA subrogation and the current
process used by CMS-that is, each independent ERISA plan's right to
seek reimbursement is governed by its own language .3 Although ERISA
gives plan providers the authority to compel reimbursement, it is
contractual obligations that provide for the process.32 While this may
provide for an unfair outcome, or at least one "sympathetic" to the plaintiff
with regard to recovery, the plan itself will at least provide controlling
language that allows the plaintiffs attorney (and the liability carrier, for
that matter) to posture accordingly during settlement negotiations.
B. Ahlborn: A Model Example ofSubrogationIssues From Settlement
Proceeds
In 2006, the Supreme Court of the United States brought the
contemporary concerns of various subrogation tactics to national attention
with its decision in Arkansas DepartmentofHealth and Human Services v.
Ahlborn.3 4 In Ahlborn, a nineteen-year-old college student suffered
permanent brain damage and other catastrophic injuries from an automobile
collision.
While her attorney pursued a recovery from potential
tortfeasors, her financial status made her eligible for the state's applicable

26. See Drake, supra note 24.
27. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. O'Hara, 604 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2010).
28. Id. at 1234.
29. Id. at 1235.
30. See id. at 1236.
31. See id. at 1237.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 1237-38 (noting that, while finding a measure of sympathy for the
plaintiff, the enforcement of reimbursement language in ERISA-backed plans produces a
cost-benefit for all beneficiaries).
34. Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006).
35. Id. at 272-73.
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Medicaid plan, which began to pay for substantial medical treatment
during her recovery. 7 Ultimately, Ahlborn's attorneys reached a gross
settlement agreement totaling $550,000.38 However, unlike jury verdicts,
in which an allocation of damages is likely to solve the issue (i.e., the jury
attributes X amount of the total damages award to pain and suffering, Y
amount of the total damages award to medical bills, etc.), a gross settlement
figure is simply one number. Thus the court asks-when the Arkansas
Department of Health and Human Services (ADHS), the state agency that
administered the applicable Medicaid program, comes looking to recoup
payment for its $215,000 worth of medical bills, is it permitted to a full
recoupment from a gross settlement that did not distinguish as to what
amount of that settlement was attributed to Ms. Ahlborn's damages from
medical bills? In a unanimous decision, the Court said "no."3
As a matter of judicial economy, cost effectiveness, and an emotional
amelioration on clients, settlement is often preferred to a complete judicial
resolution on the merits of any given claim. 40 In light of that principle, it
becomes clear why Ms. Ahlbom and others may be so substantially
burdened by these subrogation techniques. Justice Stevens, writing for the
Court, states it eloquently: "For just as there are risks in underestimating
the value of readily calculable damages in settlement negotiations, so also
is there a countervailing concern that a rule of absolute priority might
preclude settlement in a large number of cases, and be unfair to the
recipient in others." 41 Thus, in interpreting federal Medicaid law
authorizing the ADHS to recoup its conditional payments, the Court limited
that recovery to the proportion of the value of Ms. Ahlbom's claim that
could be attributed to medical costs, not a cart blanche subrogation of her
gross settlement.42
While Ahlborn involves a Medicaid subrogation claim, the holding is
instructive because it highlights the very same problem that CMS and
MSPRC have created in Medicare liens regarding the settlement process.
36. While it is true that Medicaid is supported by federal and state funds and
administered by state agencies, where Medicare, by contrast, is a federal program
administered by a federal agency, Hadden v. United States, No. 1:08-CV-10, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 69383, at *9-10 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 6, 2009), plaintiffs' advocates have still
argued Ahlborn in the Medicare context. See, e.g., id.
37. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 273.
38. Id.at 274.
39. Id. at 275, 292.
40. See, e.g., Bradley v. Sebelius, 621 F.3d 1330, 1339 (11th Cir. 2010).
41. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 288 (emphasis added).
42. 1d. at 292.
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Defense counsel is not likely to offer an "itemized" settlement, and
plaintiffs counsel is not likely to accept one, because it may cause
substantial issues regarding the plaintiffs release.4 3
Trial courts, however, have been hesitant to find Ahlborn 's holding
In fact, some courts have
directly applicable to Medicare claims.4
construed Ahlborn narrowly even in the Medicaid context, as a United
States District Court demonstrated in Tristani v. Richman.4 5 There, the trial
judge permitted a state subrogation provision to allocate the settlement
provisions of a claim that was not allocated by the parties, 46 effectively
superseding the more equitable approach to non-allocated settlements
exemplified by Ahlborn.47
C.

Subrogation Tactics and the Searchfor a Trend-The Courts of
Appeals Weigh In

Two leading United States Court of Appeals cases demonstrate the
government's aggressively evolving approach to subrogation of Medicare
payments. In Thompson v. Goetzmann,48 the Fifth Circuit, in the first
federal appellate review of the government's subrogation action against a
Medicare beneficiary,49 prevented what would likely have been a harsh, if
not erroneous, interpretation of the Medicare Secondary Payer (MSP)
provisions regarding "self-insured" plans. In Thompson, a Medicare
beneficiary had settled a products liability claim with the manufacturer of a
hip prosthetic. 0 In an "all of the above" approach, DHHS brought an
action against the Medicare beneficiary, her attorney, and the manufacturer

43. Defense counsel will protect his client's future exposure by requiring plaintiff to
sign a "release of all claims." Thus, any type of itemized settlement agreement would still
make future claims against defendant possible if the injury had not been discovered at the
time of settlement.
44. See, e.g., Hadden v. United States, No. 1:08-CV-10, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69383,
at *9-10 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 6, 2009).
45. Tristani v. Richman, 609 F. Supp. 2d 423 (W.D. Pa. 2009), af'd in part, vacated in
part, Tristani ex rel. Karnes v. Richman, 652 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2011).
46. Id. at 464-66.
47. See id. at 465-66. Pennsylvania law also precluded the settling-plaintiff from later
making a showing that such a settlement did not fully compensate, or "make whole," the
plaintiff, or that her injuries were worth more than the settlement amount. Id.
48. Thompson v. Goetzmann, 337 F.3d 489 (5th Cir. 2003).
49. Id. at 494 ("We are the first appellate court to address the issue of an alleged
tortfeasor's reimbursement liability under the MSP [Medicare Secondary Payer] statute.").
50. Id. at 493.
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of the prosthetic that paid the settlement.51 As noted above, the MSP
statute authorizes the government to recover any conditional payment from
what it deems "self-insured" plans, as well as general liability policy
coverage. 52 However, in Thompson, the government asked the court to take
that provision to its extreme, effectively applying a right of subrogation
against any settlement or judgment simply by identifying the manufacturer
of the hip prosthetic as a self-insured entity.53 Because the designation of a
self-insured entity "does not exist in a vacuum within the MSP statute," 5 4
the court notes that the statute is clear on its face-a self-insured entity is
one that would constitute a primary plan as defined by the statute's
language,55 and a Medicare beneficiary's settlement with a tortfeasor does
not vest in the government a sweeping, unchecked power to subrogate. 56
As the Thompson court states, the relevant MSP rights of recovery are
narrowly tailored to plans, not to a broad category of "tortfeasors."" If
Plaintiff A, a Medicare beneficiary, sues and recovers a settlement or
judgment from Defendants B and C for her injuries, all parties to this
litigation would become potential defendants to the government's action
under a theory that Defendant B and C's failure to insure themselves still
designates them as self-insured. But it is Plaintiff A who suffers the most,
because it is, after all, her compensation that is at stake. Her status as a
Medicare beneficiary alone, and not the fact that the defendant tortfeasors
were covered by a primary plan, would have exposed her recovery to the
government's subrogation efforts. This "full house" approach to naming
any and all parties to the initial tort litigation as defendants may again
obfuscate the injured plaintiffs chances of settlement, because all
tortfeasors of Medicare beneficiaries would now have a second lawsuit
waiting for them in the wings.
Seven years after Thompson, the Eleventh Circuit decided Bradley v.
Sebelius." In Bradley, the plaintiffs were the survivors of a deceased
Medicare beneficiary who died in the care of a negligent nursing home.
51. Id. at 493-94.

52. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2006).
53. Thompson, 337 F.3d at 495.
54. Id. at 497.
55. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii) (specifying workers' compensation plans,
automobile or other liability insurance policies (including self-insured plans), and no-fault
insurance policies).
56. See Thompson, 337 F.3d at 498, 503-04.
57. Id. at 499.
58. Bradley v. Sebelius, 621 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2010).
59. Id at 1332.
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The decedent's survivors settled with the defendant nursing home for the
liability policy limits. 6 0 As a precautionary measure, the survivors asked
the local probate court to determine what, if any, amount it owed Medicare
from the settlement. 6 ' Medicare asserted a subrogation lien against the
survivor's recovery under a strict interpretation of administrative field
manuals.62 A fundamental issue the Bradley court points to is the fact that
the government is attempting to recoup payments from survivors who are
entitled to damages by law that consist of, among other things, mental pain
and suffering and emotional loss. 63 The beneficiary's decedents were
collecting from a liability insurance policy that compensated them for the
negligent loss of their father under state wrongful death law, not for
medical bills or other special damages. 64 As the court explains: "Nowhere
in the definition of primary plan are listed 'surviving children with tort
property beneficiary rights."' 6 5
In pursuing this lien, CMS and DHHS again seem to insist that no
allocation of settlement funds would be adhered to unless the survivors
pursued a case to judgment.66 Again, the court invokes a concern all too
parallel to that of Justice Stevens' opinion in Ahlborn6 7 when it notes: "The
Secretary's position would have a chilling effect on settlement. The
Secretary's position compels plaintiffs to force their tort claims to trial,
burdening the court system. It is a financial disincentive to accept
otherwise reasonable settlement offers. It would allow tortfeasors to escape
responsibility." 6 8 It is substantial in itself that a beneficiary must exhaust
all available administrative remedies before challenging an action by CMS
to subrogate in federal court. 69 A holding for the government in Bradley

60. Id.
61. Id. at 1337-38.
62. Id. at 1338. The government asserted that Medicare field manuals should be given
the authority and force of law. Id. The court rejected these manuals as controlling
authority, citing substantial case law holding to the contrary. Id. (citing United States ex rel.
Walker v. R & F Props. of Lake Cnty., Inc., 433 F.3d 1349, 1357 (11th Cir. 2005)).
63. See Bradley, 621 F.3d at 1337; FLA. STAT. §§ 768.16-768.23 (2003).
64. Bradley, 621 F.3d at 1337.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 1339.
67. Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 288 (2006).
68. Bradley, 621 F.3d at 1339.
69. See Braucher v. Swagat Grp., LLC, No. 07-CV-3253, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21190, at *6 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2011) (dismissing plaintiff's action to adjudicate a Medicare
lien because the court lacked jurisdiction "to review MSPRC's claim for part of the Fund
except through judicial review of the final administrative decision").
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would move the starting line for a Medicare beneficiary's challenge miles
yet down the road.
D. The FrontLines-How Trial Courts are Shaping Medicare
Subrogation
As Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia once said in a prominent
constitutional debate with Justice Stephen Breyer, a trial judge can often
resolve a case with a discretion that no other level of the judiciary enjoys.70
And thus, with so little appellate authority-like Thompson and Bradleyto draw on, the district courts are largely breaking ground on the emerging
issues regarding the government's actions to recover Medicare payments.
A sampling of recent district court opinions will showcase the need for
more authority on this subject.
As previously noted, the Ahlborn case sought review of similar
subrogation issues involving the Medicaid program.7 1 One district court
ruling involving Medicare, giving perhaps much credence to Justice
Scalia's conclusion above, refused to find any such similarity.72 In Hadden
v. United States, the injured plaintiff argued the equitable language of
Ahlborn as persuasive precedent after Medicare asserted a lien of almost
one-half of his settlement. 7 The Court dismissed the Ahlborn comparison
without applying any principles of special damages allocation.7 4 In fact, it
appears the ruling was inconsistent with at least some of the language in
Bradley only one year later.
Consider how one district court dealt with what might be described as
the most typical piece of ammunition used in motions for summary
judgment at trial-the statute of limitations. A close reading of 42 U.S.C. §
1395 et seq. will show that Congress, whether intentionally or not, failed to
70. The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, A Conversation on the
Constitution-Part 1, YouTUBE (Oct. 23, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oIBMO2Lw7w&feature=1ist related&playnext=1&list=SPDA5818F20281BBB2.
71. See Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268.
72. Hadden v. United States, No. 1:08-CV-10, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69383, at *9-10
(W.D. Ky. Aug. 6, 2009).
73. Id.
74. Id. Notably, the court distinguishes Medicare from Medicaid by contrasting the
agencies that run the programs as "federal" and "state," yet acknowledges that Medicaid is
still governed "within the confines of federal parameters." Id.
75. Contrary to the Bradley court's deference to the judicially economic process of
settlement, the court in Hadden states, "had plaintiff wanted equitable allocation and
subrogation principles to apply in this case, then he should have proceeded to trial on the
merits of his tort claim in state court." Id. at *18.
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include a statute of limitations for the government's subrogation actions
pursuant to the MSP's grant of authority. 6 It was precisely this problem
the court faced in United States v. Stricker.77 Stricker arose out of the
government's action to recoup payments stemming from a massive class
action settlement against defendant chemical companies that yielded some
$300 million worth of payments to at least some alleged Medicare
beneficiaries.7 8 Perhaps because the class action involved thousands of
plaintiffs, the government named only the plaintiffs' attorney and the
chemical companies as defendants when it brought its action to subrogate.7 9
Because of a complete absence of an applicable statute of limitations within
42 U.S.C. § 1395, the court applied provisions of the Federal Claims
Collection Act (FCCA),80 and for the first time distinguished between the
government's actions against an attorney and those against a corporate
third-party tortfeasor.8 ' Subsequent holdings have yet to disagree with
Stricker's conclusions regarding the applicable statute of limitations
pertaining to subrogation actions under the MSP.
A very recent district court case regarding Medicare subrogation
tactics may showcase an escalation of the government's approach to the
issue. As recently as May 2011, the United States District Court for the
District of Arizona, in Haro v. Sebelius,82 dismissed the government's
cause of action pending the plaintiffs appeal to CMS, even noting the use
of what plaintiffs counsel deemed questionable tactics by the government
to expedite recovery of its payments.83 The plaintiffs in Haro sought an
administrative appeal of Medicare's demand amount under CMS's own
appeals policy 84 as prescribed in Title 42 of the Code of Federal
76. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 to 1395b-10 (2006).
77. United States v. Stricker, No. CV 09-BE-2423-E, 2010 WL 6599489 (N.D. Ala.
Sept. 30, 2010).
78. Id. at *2.
79. See id. at *2-3.
80. 28 U.S.C. § 2415 (2006).
81. Stricker, 2010 WL 6599489, at *6-12. An action to subrogate against a
beneficiary's attorney will attach to a six-year statute of limitations. Id. at *9. An
attorney's contractual relationship with his injured client is what gives rise to his
involvement in a potential subrogation action by the government, and the relevant portions
of the FCCA apply a six-year statute to those actions sounding in contract. Id. at *9.
Conversely, as to a corporate tortfeasor, because it is that defendant's alleged tort on the
beneficiary that gives rise to his status as a potential defendant in the subrogation action, the
relevant FCCA tort statute of limitations of three years is applied. Id. at *8.
82. Haro v. Sebelius, 789 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (D. Ariz. 2011).

83. Id. at 1182.
84. Id. at 1180.
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CMS sought to collect, however, before plaintiffs had
Regulations.
exhausted their rights to appeal the demand, and even employed what
plaintiffs' counsel described as "the use of scare tactics accompanying its
pre-decisional reimbursement demands, such as: imposition of exorbitant
interest on unpaid claims; threats of cessation of the beneficiary's Social
Security or Railroad Retirement payments, and collection referrals to
several federal law enforcement agencies."
Further, the government demanded that the beneficiary "must" satisfy
the lien before any settlement disbursements would be made. The court
also points out that the government confused beneficiaries when it implied
It is unclear why the
that they had no recourse to challenge the lien.8
89
government would alter standard demand language by implying that a
beneficiary had no recourse but to comply with Medicare's demand. This
case demonstrates both confusion and inconsistency within the agency.
CMS's actions against its beneficiaries ought to present uniformity and
fairness.
Still, not all trial courts are as deferential to the beneficiary's cause as
Haro and others have been. In Benson v. Sebelius,90 decided only two
months prior to Haro, the court upheld a Medicare lien of some $40,000
worth of payments against a $90,000 wrongful death settlement.9 1 The
Benson court distinguished Bradley from the facts before it by assuming
that because the plaintiff signed a release that included medical liens
against the defendant, this language somehow affirmatively demonstrated
the plaintiff did in fact recover medical damages. 9 2 The court presumes to
know what the parties "contemplated" during settlement negotiations
simply by reading a sentence from the release documents. 93 Again, this

85. See 42 C.F.R. § 405.942(a) (2012).
86. Haro, 789 F. Supp. 2d at 1182.
87. Id.

88. Id. at 1183.
89. Id. This was evinced when the court points out that DHHS "changed the demand
for immediate payment from 'must pay' to 'should pay' . . . and fails to include language
explaining that filing an appeal or waiver will suspend collection activities until agency
review results in a final determination." Id.
90. Benson v. Sebelius, 771 F. Supp. 2d 68 (D.D.C. 2011).
91. Id. at 69-70.
92. Id. at 75.
93. Id. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a release that defense counsel would approve
that did not release her client from exposure to potential medical liens, regardless of the
source.
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type of subjective standard is not consistent, nor could it be said to benefit
either party's efforts during settlement negotiations.
Even in those trial court decisions where the Medicare beneficiary has
"lost," the seemingly inequitable result placed on the injured beneficiary is
not lost on the courts. Judge Russell's sympathetic tone for the plaintiff in
Hadden is demonstrative:
Nonetheless, the Court is not unsympathetic to the dilemma facing Plaintiff
and his counsel.... While CMS essentially receives free representation for
the collection of its claim and no offset for a fault allocation, Plaintiff must
pay attorney's fees and costs for a settlement he perceived to be based on
an exposure or fault allocation by the settling defendant. 94
CONCLUSION
It does not take much stretch of the imagination to understand why a
Medicare beneficiary should pay the government back when a primary
policy covers her medical costs flowing from a tortious injury. In an effort
to redress taxpayer grievances by minimizing excessive government
expenditures and to contemporaneously prevent a beneficiary from
receiving a "windfall" from her Medicare eligibility status, Congress, in
good faith, enacted the relevant recovery portions of the Medicare
Secondary Payer Act. However, in doing so, it may have created a
"windfall" of its own. As the court noted in Hadden, an injured Medicare
beneficiary negotiates a settlement for two parties now-herself and the
government.95 The government receives essentially free representation by
the injured beneficiary's attorney, while at the same time eyes that very
beneficiary and her attorney as potential defendants, should the government
bring suit. Meanwhile, despite the Supreme Court's holding in Ahlborn,
principles of equitable allocation seem to be rejected by both CMS and the
courts. Medicare will claim to reduce its lien when considering the
beneficiary's case costs and attorney fees, but is less forthcoming about
how it calculates that lien in the first place with regard to each particular
medical treatment.
CMS's current subrogation efforts can and do burden the settlement
process for injured Medicare beneficiaries, and may burden the court
system with unneeded adjudication for approval of reimbursement
demands, as well as claims that would have otherwise settled. Medicare

94. Hadden v. United States, No. 1:08-CV-10, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69383, at *19-20
(W.D. Ky. Aug. 6, 2009).
95. Id.
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plaintiffs are in the dark as to net settlement amounts before disbursement
because of the inability of CMS to provide demands for reimbursement
timely or predictably.
Plaintiffs and defendants in tort litigation are turning to the court
system to fill the holes of an administrative effort that lacks uniformity,
resulting in sporadic and sometimes even misguided applications of the
government's subrogation authority. The concerns highlighted herein
appear to be getting at least some attention. On June 22, 2011, the House
Energy and Commerce Committee held a hearing on precisely these issues,
noting in its opening statement the inefficiency of the current process.9 6 It
appears that, to at least some extent, these concerns are being discussed in
Washington.97 But without much needed clarification by Congress, the
equitable rights of Medicare beneficiaries will remain the subject of many
disputes between governmental agencies, insurance companies, and
plaintiffs' attorneys alike. And without more predictability and stability in
recovery actions by the Medicare Secondary Payer Recovery Contractor,
the courts will continue to be forced to resolve subrogation disputes by
filling in the gaps left by Congress.
Huntington M Willis

96. Protecting Medicare with Improvements to the Secondary Payer Regime: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy &
Commerce, 112th Cong. 1-3 (2011) (statement of Rep. Stearns, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Oversight and Investigations).
97. See id.
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